Coffee production in Kenya entered into a phase of decline from the mid-1950s. As large producers, notably Brazil and Columbia, continued 
where many Kikuyu were, or had been, in detention, 13 the colonial government seized the initiative to embark on a programme of rural restructuring and social engineering to produce an African yeomanry, though at the cost of forcing many European settlers out of production.
The Swynnerton Plan was advanced in 1954 14 , under the canopy of the Emergency. The plan combined the political intention of privileging loyalists with the economic goal of expanding the production of coffee and other primary commodities. Promoting a 'landed class' of commercially 'energetic' Africans and a 'landless' rural proletariat, the plan encouraged the consolidation of smallholdings, to be surveyed, registered and developed as freehold farms with titles. Initially only a small number of farmers were permitted to grow Arabica coffee, and the rate of expansion for each farmer was limited. Agricultural officers strictly enforced high standards of coffee husbandry, which led to the expanded production of low cost, high quality Arabica coffee. 15 This put pressure on European growers to achieve the same outcome, but for many this was a goal which evaded them. The plan, passed off as a favour from liberalizing late colonialism, sought to evade African agitation for land in settler areas by breaking the cycle of land deterioration and rural poverty in the overpopulated reserves, moving the greatest possible numbers of Africans from subsistence to commercial farming. 16 The government's ambitious policy was to 'double Kenya's coffee production.' 17 The initial tempo of expansion was accelerated in response to unrelenting global market pressures from the mid-1950s, which compelled the colonial government to beckon broad layers of low cost African farmers into Arabica coffee production, in a bid to save its tax base. Local 'cess' payments, a levy on coffee farmers to support county council finances, and tax revenues from export sales, were essential to the government's budget. If the industry were allowed to shrink and shrivel, the effects would be felt throughout the entire superstructure of the colonial state, whose agricultural and veterinary departments mushroomed after 1945 during the course of the 'second colonial occupation'. During the war against Mau Mau, the coercive apparatus 13 and provincial administration was also greatly expanded. 18 To meet the rising costs of this enlargement, African coffee production grew more rapidly than anticipated in the Swynnerton Plan. By 1960, 33,000 acres of African-grown coffee had been planted by 105,000 growers, averaging less than one-third of an acre each. The Swynnerton target for 1968 was passed in 1962-63, and almost doubled by 1964, when nearly 236,000 growers had planted 125,000 acres.
Spurred on by the lifting of restrictions on African coffee production, the crop rapidly expanded, with more than 110,000 African growers producing alongside 1,200 European farms and plantations in 1960. 19 The increased output of a variety of crops from small farms, associated with the Swynnerton Plan, involved the injection of substantial resources in the form of infrastructure, processing and marketing facilities, and showed an annual rate of growth of marketed output of 7.3% from 1954 to 1963, and 12.6% from 1964 to 1970. 20 By 1967 the proportion of marketed output that came from small farm areas had reached 50%, with coffee production responsible for around half of this output.
The powerful emergence of small African farmers was controlled by centralized institutional structures, which became dominant features of the industry. The Coffee Board of Kenya (C.B.K.), founded in 1933, was responsible for regulating production and the organization of coffee auctions. The Coffee Marketing Board (C.M.B.), set up in 1945, held a similar grip over coffee sales and managing payments through a pool system. In addition, the Kenya Planters Cooperative Union (K.P.C.U.) was a country wide co-operative, which was owned and managed entirely by coffee growers through a board of directors. It was founded in 1937 as the Thika Planters Co-operative Union, to purchase supplies for its members. In 1945, the colonial government enacted a new co-operative ordinance, which enabled the K.P.C.U. to acquire the entire agency business for the co-operative society sector of the coffee industry. Its membership comprised all coffee co-operatives and over 90 % of coffee estates. In 1947, the K.P.C.U. completed its milling monopoly by purchasing the mills of the East African Coffee Curing Company, an amalgamation of several small mills, which incorporated coffee milling, liquoring and storage. The main role of the K.P.C.U. was to mill and grade parchment coffee from estates and societies. It also provided advice on coffee husbandry, agricultural inputs such as fertilizers and machinery, short-term credit, transit and warehousing, receiving and channeling payment to members together with education and information to coffee growers.
The K.P.C.U. paid farmers through a pool system, whereby sale proceeds were combined before determining the final average rate to pay farmers. Payments were made after deducting marketing expenses incurred by the C.B.K., and the final price was the same for all farmers.
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Exports from European-owned plantations declined in relation to rising volumes of African production. 22 The state was obliged to sacrifice uncompetitive small and medium European producers at the altar of the industry's survival, uprooting its erstwhile biases, and abandoning many of the previous favours granted to settlers. That said, some large plantation companies also made gains at the expense of small to medium planters, whose profit margins were close to collapse. The government's general economic predicament disabled any commitment to underwrite the losses incurred by falling prices through subsidies to the industry. Indeed, it was rather looking at ways to raise extra revenue to ease its financial burden. As economic pressures mounted, only limited financing for estate and plantation production remained available from the Board of Agriculture, through its rehabilitation and development funds, the European Agricultural Settlement Board, and the Land and Agricultural Bank.
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The Board of Agriculture warned settler farmers that they could not be shielded 'against the effects occasioned by the present shortage both of revenue to finance current needs and of loan funds for development.' 24 To be sure, there was a rapid expansion of banking and financial institutions in the colony during this period, but commercial banks provided a decreasing amount of agriculture's capital requirements. By 1955, commercial banks were pursuing a policy of disengagement from long-term loans to European farmers, as the lion's share of increased local lending flowed into short-term commercial credit to finance imports, which had been in short supply. 25 The state reduced financial assistance to settlers when they needed it most. As global coffee prices plummeted, European farmers found it increasingly difficult to compete with low cost African cultivators, exposing long-term structural problems in Kenya's economy. The government endeavoured to show some support, by providing extension staff to supervise processing factory work and to teach growers, and by helping emerging co-operatives.
However, officials insisted that this was to be paid for from the industry's profits, through extra cess payments, set at 5% of the value of clean coffee, and a 12.5 % export tax. The latter measure provoked settlers to found the Kenya Coffee Growers Association [K.C.G.A.], and the tax was revoked in 1957. 26 The K.C.G.A. was more generally created to meet competition from abroad, regulate conflicts of interest, and centralize industrial relations for disputes mediation with workers.
It was legislation to end income tax relief that provoked the greatest furore, as coffee planters had earlier been permitted to average their incomes over a number of years.
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Forty Kiambu coffee growers assembled to express 'strong opposition' to Finance Minister Vasey's measure, and they demanded that the C.B.K. represent their concerns. They pleaded that the 'iniquitous proposal' would make it difficult for them to 'make ends meet', and drew up their own proposal for a tax rate which 'should not exceed' 12 shillings in the pound, with exemptions for development expenditure. 28 Their resolution, which was forwarded to the Nairobi coffee conference in July 1958, vocalized the grievances of European planters everywhere by calling for an independent inquiry into the budget proposals 'with a view to ending the need for such high taxation.'
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To placate the outcry the C.B.K. acknowledged that 'planters were perturbed at the rate of the tax' 30 and set up a committee to look into the controversial deduction. Nonetheless, the government proceeded with its budget proposal for Africa, coveting access to Britain's protected colonial markets. 40 The battle for quotas gave a huge political advantage to the Americans, as it was by far the largest single market, consuming more than half the world's coffee. America's intake of East African coffee, though still very small in proportion to coffee imports from Latin America, had increased by 150% since 1953.
The President of the National Coffee Association of America, on a visit to Nairobi, assured planters of more sales, provided that 'the price remained right and the quality was maintained.
The demand for your coffee is growing in our country and production is rising in Africa, so if your reputation for good coffee remains as high as it has done for some time, we will take more of it.' Asked if importing East African coffee would affect any coffee agreement with Latin The world market had been temporarily stabilized only by the large stocks retained by dominant producers, albeit at the expense of building up even larger excesses, which Blundell estimated would exceed 1,566,000 tons beyond the estimated world annual consumption of some 2,204,000 tons. This was underlined by a report issued by the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization, which estimated that world coffee production for 1958-9 would be 9% higher than the previous year. Blundell drew attention to the support the government derived from the coffee industry, and emphasized that 'it was reluctant to enter a quota system to reduce production,' 43 a strategy advocated by the American government's Coffee Study Group, based in Washington. 44 Blundell's stance was founded on the assumption that rising coffee production amongst low cost African farmers would help the industry to meet 'the challenge of falling prices...'
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In full knowledge of the global dimensions of overproduction, Blundell's proposal to step up production followed logically from the experience of the 1930s depression years, when African farmers in other colonies were urged to produce their way out of the crisis. It was assumed that
African smallholders and their families would work longer hours, labour more intensively, and be prepared to wait for payment in the knowledge that the crop was their own. This strategy was facilitated by lifting erstwhile restrictions on African coffee production, and was sustained by support from the state through the expansion of extension services. It was believed that this would also pressure settlers into reducing their overheads, and most were compelled to forego the increased costs of spraying, fertilisers and mechanization. At the same time, Blundell repeatedly pointed to the inevitability of 'severe competition' in world markets, and warned that the region's coffee producers would 'continue to attract good prices only if we maintain quality.' Overall, Blundell understood that the industry would have to undergo a profound restructuring if it was to survive, and that many European coffee farmers would necessarily go to wall, a price which he was privately and reluctantly resigned to paying. The aim was to maximize coffee exports at the minimum possible production cost, whilst preserving traditional markets for premium Arabica beans. The urgency of this strategy was determined by the haste to curtail fiscal losses and maintain hard currency earnings. 46 There was a risk that intensified labour processes would lower quality, thus compromising sales. Alongside an increased incidence of leaf rust and coffee berry disease, coffee growers had suffered several seasons of bad weather, and there was a marked tendency to allow trees to overbear.
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Many casual field workers picked unripe green cherry to fill their four-gallon paraffin tins, in response to low picking rates and rationalized working practices on coffee plantations. thereby challenging the strategy of dropping prices whilst expanding sales. The chairman of the C.M.B., R. S.Wollen, was 'categorical' in his announcement to the annual Nairobi coffee conference that Kenya 'would not be a signatory to this scheme.' He argued for the scarcity value of Kenya's high quality coffees, and maintained that it was cheaper coffees that were in 'oversupply.' Wollen remained 'confident that however much coffee is released in the world we shall always be able to sell our total production and at some premium for quality.'
Vocalizing the position of a significant lobby that favoured going it alone, Wollen urged that Kenya's producers should not be swayed by the threat of catastrophe, since the quality of their coffees was above the rest. Kenya's coffee production was increasing by 2,500 tons a year, and plans were underway to develop the potential market amongst Africans in Kenya for cheap coffee, whilst market outlets in Rhodesia and South Africa were also being explored. In reality, these options were barely enough to make a difference, and Kenya's premium coffees were tethered only by a slender thread to German buyers. In a more sober frame of mind, Wollen supply would almost certainly keep prices in the doldrums. There were signs of brinkmanship among the warring factions, who taunted each other with the prospect of market collapse, in order to extract a higher quota for themselves. Kenya's C.M.B. held fast to its belief that African producers had a significant leverage over their Latin American rivals, and that Brazil would not seek 'to prompt such a disaster.' However, Brazil and Columbia sought to entice the Africans into a world-wide quota agreement, which they would dominate. The suspicion amongst East
African producers was that the provisions of the proposed agreement did 'not augur entirely well' for them, and they barely disguised their deep resentment at a pact that would involve the region's producers retaining some 24,000 tons of their produce 'just to protect the artificially high prices' sought by Latin American producers. 56 However, the leading settler politician, Bruce Mackenzie, cautioned against complacency, and warned that the prospect of Brazil offloading its stockpiles, accumulating at 58,000 tons a year, was a real one. 57 Finally, an agreement on export quotas was reached, following a surprisingly abject capitulation by East African producers who agreed to withhold 54,000 tons from the market, more than double the previous figure. This submission coincided with a new provision in the pact, excluding any new markets developed by producing countries from export quotas 58 , though it was far from certain that non-quota markets would suffice to soak up surpluses. This problem was highlighted by figures released by the American Department of Agriculture, forecasting record production levels of African coffee, estimated at 614,800 tons for 1959-60, of which 585,800 tons would be exportable, 5% above the previous year. 59 The situation worsened in the following year, as East African producers signed another short-term international coffee pact, forfeiting the right to restrict their exports voluntarily. They were now bound by export quotas, which were revised downward by 11,600 tons to 138,040 tons for 1960-1, given that prices had been falling 'throughout the season for all grades and classes', a trend compounded by the generally poor quality of the season's crop. Blundell took the opportunity to stress again the government's concern to encourage African farmers who were in a stronger position to keep their production costs low.
This would enable the C.M.B. to auction larger quantities of coffee for non-quota markets, with less fear of the commodity being sold off at below its costs of production and distribution. This indicated the government's intention to open the gates even wider to broader layers of African farmers engaged in coffee production. Blundell qualified his support for quotas if the reduction 'was not too great', so that producers were prepared for the 'upward swing in the coffee cycle.' 63 Blundell's formula was that quotas were compatible with the expansion of coffee production, as long as African farmers were empowered to sustain the industry until prices were able to climb out of their trough. As only the fittest European producers would survive these trials and tribulations, Blundell envisioned an industry in which there was room for both low cost African farmers and rationalized European producers.
Blundell also hoped that Kenyan growers could survive 'a complete price collapse of Brazilian arabicas,' as they 'could probably continue to command premium prices,' on the strength of reputed excellence. Nonetheless, he was attentive to the risk of a price war, in which 'there was a danger that the price of even the best qualities would decline precipitously.' fallen by £200 a ton during the previous four years, the industry had managed to sustain itself by exporting, on average, more than £10,000,000 worth of coffee annually, through increasing production by more than 9,000 tons a year and by 'preserving quality.' 67 Nonetheless, without a larger quota to soak up cumulative surpluses, and given the limited absorption capacity of nonquota markets, such a strategy was storing up inescapable problems for the future.
Agricultural research underpinned higher production volumes. To keep the industry safe from the onslaught of coffee berry disease, leaf rust and insect pests, a research grant of £21,235 had been announced in May 1960 from the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund.
Research into methods of increasing crop yields and soil conservation were also prioritized. 68 The most important work occurred at the Coffee Research Station situated on Jacaranda Estate in Ruiru. Working closely with the Soil Conservation Service, the station's research focused on entomology, plant physiology and pathology and agricultural chemistry. There were field trials for appropriate fertilizers and methods of mulching, pruning, cultivation, spraying and irrigation. Varieties underwent trials at the station's coffee nurseries. These efforts were supported by a major reconstruction programme at the Kenya Planters' Co-operative Union mill in Nairobi, with plans to process 200 tons daily.
A worsening crisis
The of its total crop. However, its crop estimate of 38,000 tons for the 1962-3 season was 11,000 tons in excess of the previous season, from which there was an unsold surplus of 3,000 tons, with substantial future increases predicted by the C.B.K. The board expressed concern that Kenya was on course to exceed its export quota to the traditional high priced markets by more than 20%, and that efforts to unload this surplus onto non-quota markets would cost the planter 'quite a lot of money.' 76 Some 10,000 tons were to be disposed of locally and onto non-quota markets, notably in Eastern Europe and East Asia, though at a 'substantial reduction' on the quota price. With Kenya's coffee production 'increasing far more rapidly than its export outlets' there was 'drastic control' over new plantings in an effort to come into line with export quotas.
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This compounded the problems created by the industry's tightest ever margins. In the previous four seasons the average price on local markets had been approximately £52 a ton, one-sixth of the price obtained on quota markets, and the average price obtained on non-quota markets approximated £150 per ton, giving a combined non-quota average of £132.5 per ton.
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Such a low price acted as a drag on the much higher average price attained by coffee sold on quota markets.
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Unless the world price for Kenya's high quality premium Arabica showed a steep rise, or it was able to substantially increase the volume and price of its sales, the Verjee Tribunal, believed that the industry would 'be placed in a dangerously precarious position.' This body was convened in 1962 to investigate the avalanche of coffee plantation strikes which erupted in response to intensified labour processes brought on by declining world prices. Nonetheless, this could only be a short-run solution, since all world producers were competing in non-quota markets. Ultimately, this crisis necessitated the destruction of vast quantities of surplus coffee, to create an equilibrium between buyers and sellers. Non-quota markets 9,800 £150 Total 41,000
Overall average price per ton £257
During 1961, Kenya's premium grade coffees rose by £28 to an average price of £348 a ton, but it British market contracted and recently gained markets in Holland and Sweden were lost. 82 The survival of the industry now hung largely by the slender thread of the market in West Germany, Kenya's 'most important buyer,' which was menaced by E.E.C. regulations.
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Renewed concerns over quality surfaced with signs that German roasters 'were turning away' from Kenya coffees. German buyers were unwilling to pay high prices for coffee of declining quality, and were looking at other suppliers. In November 1962, Schweggmann and Co., agents for East African coffees in Bremen, confirmed that 'most' German coffee roasters were 'not using' Kenya coffee in their blends anymore, because of the drop in quality. buyers are involved and should they change their mind the export situation could change in a few days.' 84
The International Coffee Agreement and the rebirth of protectionism
World producers were now on a collision course, which the U.S. moved to arrest through initiating longer-term quota agreements. The price falls consequent on the end of the Korean war, together with cuts in American foreign direct investment in Latin America, had led rival producers to seek to make up for lost revenue. Denied the expected resources for diversification, which had been channeled into Western Europe's post-war recovery, Latin
American producers were forced back into an accentuated dependency upon raw materials. 85 East African producers, starved of investment and compelled to accelerate production to generate the hard currency to meet the demands of Britain's post-war reconstruction, were also forced to tread this path, creating the potential for serious conflict.
The coffee quota system was politically dominated by South American producers, but their traditionally close ties to the United States were under strain. The Americans were less able to support regional clients with resources and favours, which were also in demand elsewhere, putting erstwhile loyalties to the test. An overstretched United States, seeking to secure unhindered access to hitherto protected European colonial markets, was thus compelled to restrain Latin American producers from dumping their surpluses on world markets. At least in this respect, American policy was one of benign regulatory imperialism 86 by setting quota restrictions on signatory countries, thus minimizing the consequences of overproduction and low prices. The agreement meant that most producing and consuming countries became signatories to a commonly binding undertaking, whereby a target price, or price band, for coffee was set, and export quotas were allocated to each producer. The international coffee market was subjected to a regulatory control mechanism, so that when the indicator price calculated by the I.C.O. rose over the set price, quotas were relaxed. When it fell below the set price, quotas were tightened. If prices rose particularly sharply, quotas were to be abandoned until prices declined to within the band. 90 This was therefore an export quota agreement, which supported prices by limiting the exports of each member. Another possible model was the multilateral contract, such as the Wheat Agreement, in which prices were supported within an agreed range through an undertaking by exporters to sell given amounts to importers at not more than a specified ceiling price, and an undertaking by importers to buy given amounts from exporters at not less than a specified floor price. The Tin Agreement followed yet another model, that of the buffer stock, in which prices were supported within an agreed range through the operations of an international buffer stock, which entered the market as the commodity was bought and sold at specified floor and ceiling prices. 91 Far from alleviating tensions, however, the coffee quota system exacerbated and intensified already existing contradictions. The I.C.A. system was beset with squabbles 92 over quotas from the start, and the growth of non-quota markets threatened to undermine the agreement altogether. There was an increasing volume of 'tourist' coffee, that is coffee exported, or stated to be exported, from a country other than its real place of production. 93 In an attempt to overcome this, the International Coffee Council agreed in 1966 to issue stamps and certificates of origin, and to impose severe restrictions on imports from non-members. As for the I.C.O., while it gave the appearance of unity and cohesion, it would be a mistake to see its emergence as a sign that the global industry was becoming more organized. Nor did it represent a coalition of Third World producers attempting to equalize trading relationships with erstwhile imperial powers, although in some instances this did surface as a byproduct of its role. The I.C.O. was alleged to favour the principal producers, as manifested in decisions concerning the distribution of estimated portions of a contracting market during a period of low prices. The ensuing rivalries, brought on as large numbers of producers sought to offload their surpluses, gave rise to unbearable strains, which had the potential to devastate the I.C.O.
Beneath the surface, the I.C.O. was decidedly hierarchical, with economic power highly concentrated into the hands of a few powerful producers, who could hold less significant producers to ransom, and ultimately to ruin them. Above all, the very structure of the I.C.O.
assured the mutually antagonistic interdependence of all its separate parts. In all its essential decisions, the organization was accused of bowing to the superior weight of the leading coming into bearing, the development problem of Kenya's coffee industry became not one of expanded production, but of careful limitation and quality control. This disabled coffee's prescribed role as a 'development' crop, as envisaged by the Swynnerton Plan, undermining the long-term policy of encouraging farmers to plant more coffee.
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Expanded coffee planting was more or less banned until the mid-1970s, when world prices rose again.
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After Kenya had signed up to the I.C.A., the government stress on increasing productivity and output became less evident. However, the incidence of Coffee Berry Disease Whilst land was taken out of production in the estate sector, with a decline from 80,118 acres to some 75,000 acres taking place during the course of 1965-7, the gains in African planted acreage amongst small scale farmers came to fruition and held fast. 106 In 1966, new planting was limited to 'infills', where growers were allowed to buy seedlings to replace old or diseased trees up to 6% of their total stock, though this was cut to 2% the following year. Given these stringent prohibitions, the crux of the problem was enforcement. In 1966, the government established the Coffee Authority, charged with controlling and improving the coffee grown by African co-operative societies. This was followed by the imposition of tight checks and controls over nurseries and seedlings. Amongst the penalties dispensed were the uprooting of illegally planted coffee trees and the prosecution of growers. Significant uprooting of African coffee took place in Kisii, Murang'a and Kiambu, where thousands of trees on estate nurseries were burned. 107 When Kenya joined the I.C.O. in 1966, following its earlier commitment as an I.C.A.
signatory, the country's quota was increased to 43,970 tons. Nonetheless, production levels leapt to just under 55,000 tons, leaving some 20% of the entire output to chase sales on nonquota markets. The problems brought on by this excess were compounded when Kenya's quota for the following year was adjusted downwards to 41,085 tons. 108 Competition from other producing countries for non-quota markets was intensifying, and Kenya was unable to rely on them to absorb its rising surplus. The trend towards overproduction looked set to continue, as African growers planted out expanded acreage under coffee in response to eased restrictions.
The C.M.B. anticipated a rise in production to 70,000 tons, and warned that by 1968-9, even with an increased I.C.A. quota, 'a substantial quantity would be unsaleable overseas.'
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Conclusion
The crisis developing within Kenya's agricultural economy from the mid-1950s reflected a profound upheaval in the world coffee market. A disequilibrium between production and consumption lay at the root of this crisis, creating pervasive conditions of flagging accumulation amongst producers. Faced with this situation, the colonial government's strategy, prior to joining the I.C.A., was to export the maximum amount of premium grade coffee to earn badly needed hard currency. While low prices mercilessly cut into profit margins, the Minister of Agriculture, Michael Blundell, believed that by selling more coffee at depressed prices Kenyan growers could conceivably compensate for losses. It was these considerations that lay at the source of Blundell's seemingly paradoxical recommendation to Kenya's coffee farmers to step up production during a prolonged period of contraction, even though this policy risked causing even greater price falls and set Kenya on a collision course with countries advocating quota pacts.
Under the adverse market conditions of the period, the average price of Kenya's Arabica was close enough to its costs of production to put the future of the settler sector at risk. Larger planters were those most likely to survive the enforced transformation of the industry, whilst others were too strapped for cash to stay the course. The weaker layers of European coffee capital were unable to marshal the necessary resources to restructure their businesses, and thus to come through a prolonged period of low prices. The plantation companies were able to tough out these conditions and save themselves through efficiencies and larger economies of scale. In a bid to restore the conditions for profitability across the coffee sector as a whole, and driven by the need to preserve its tax base, the colonial government responded to the reverberations of the world market by opening the doors to small scale African farmers, lifting the remaining restrictions on Arabica coffee production, previously the exclusive preserve of European settlers. Africans were beckoned into a crisis-ridden industry, hemmed in by quotas and falling prices, with increasing amounts of coffee being diverted into non-quota markets at even lower prices. Overall, the issue at stake was the extended reproduction of capital. It was here that the solution of low cost African coffee farmers came into its own, though at the expense of displacing many settlers out of the sector. The much lower labour costs of African farmers were attributable to their ownership of land and crops, longer working days, more intense working patterns and an ability to mobilize the labour power of the extended family for a small return. This made them better able to bear the burdens of global competition, and, aided by the colonial government, they soon threatened to usurp the pre-eminent position of European farmers. Overseas competition and growing African coffee production acted in tandem to devalue settler capital, pulling down the average rate of profit below what European growers could bear. 110 Abroad, the continuing prospect of the large Latin American producers releasing their surpluses onto the world market threatened a global depreciation of coffee capital. Overall, the harsh necessities of the world market dictated the adjustments to be adopted. These were enforced through the mechanisms of the I.C.A. and the I.C.O., initiated by the USA, and exercising considerable control over the relationship between the production and circulation of the coffee commodity. The expanded reproduction of coffee capital was premised on sustaining the rate and mass of profit within the industry, a necessity which pressed up against the limits imposed by international agreements. Vast surpluses of coffee were withheld from the sphere of circulation by strict quotas, and were thus unable to undergo the metamorphosis into money and capital.
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The crisis potential of this situation lay in the increasing separation between production and sale, a tendency that undermined the velocity of circulation and slowed down payments to growers. This created a dysfunctional circuit of accumulation, which endangered 
